

CON \$UMED

How Markets Corrupt Children,
Infantilize Adults, and Swallow
Citizens Whole

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paternalism matches marketing paternalism in its treatment of "clients" as needy children. Moreover, when it does focus on the evils of consumerism, American religion, like other fundamentalist criticisms of secular materialism, risks becoming antimodern and antidemocratic as well as anticonsumerist. This was apparent from the assault on pluralism by religious conservatives led by Richard John Neuhaus described in chapter 7. Religion pushed into a corner by aggressive secular materialism can quickly turn reactionary and exceedingly dangerous. Anti-consumerist jihads may curb materialism, but even when they are American, they will not improve democracy. So while there is surely room for an exploration of religious resistance to the infantalist ethos, there are many obstacles, and in the long run, solutions need to come to terms with the dilemmas of modern capitalism that have produced the infantalist ethos rather than turning their back on modernity itself.

Restoring Capitalism

The hold of consumerist capitalism over us can be moderated on the demand side by "civic consumer" resistance and bent a little on the supply side by corporate goodwill. But the market is ultimately made inflexible by capitalism's intractable survival needs. Unless ways can be found to help capitalism survive and prosper by serving real rather than faux needs, by providing services to those who are not yet consumers rather than those addicted to consumption, no resistance from inside the market is likely to succeed.

From the outset, consumer capitalism's paradox has been that those with real needs are without the means to enter the marketplace, leaving producers with no alternative to fabricating needs among those whose wants it has already oversupplied. The radical inequalities that divide developed societies from within, and continue to carve the planet latitudinally into hemispheres that exist as if on different planets, feed off capitalism's modern "triumph" as consumerism. But where there is real need, there capitalism, forever in search of profits, is not. This puts global capitalism itself in peril, not only because it risks in Jeff Faux's dramatic terms

a "global class war" but because in the absence of effective democratic leadership, even global capitalism's successes in stimulating productivity and prosperity will be jeopardized.³³ How then might the market be incited to respond?

There are commodities enough that respond to and efficiently meet the special and real needs of the developing world. For all the wants of that vast world of potential consumers, there are products galore that might secure the health and safety of children, promote the economic potential of women, and support the long-term market viability of whole societies. Just recently, an antidiarrheal oral vaccine called RotaTeq was approved that could save up to a half million children a year in Third World countries. Problem? It costs \$187.50 for a series of three oral doses, pushing it entirely out of the marketplace for those who most need it in places like Africa. The same can be said of a whole class of commodities pushed by advocates of Third World aid like Jeffrey Sachs, including nitrogen-fixing plants (to improve poor soil), water recycling devices (for water systems with too much salt), vaccines targeting childhood diseases, and nutritional supplements designed for the millions of children for whom starvation is a permanent and mortal threat.³⁴ All such commodities might help Third World citizens to pull themselves up by their bootstraps. But for the strategy to work, they have to be wearing boots. In the consumer marketplace, this means being able to pay the price of the consumables they so desperately need.

Recently, a promising commodity specifically designed to address child malnutrition was introduced in the African marketplace. Since malnourishment is a principal contributor to the diseases that afflict and kill the young, addressing hunger is also a way to treat disease. Niger has over 150,000 severely malnourished children under the age of five and 650,000 who are moderately malnourished. A quarter of children never reach the age of five. Aid workers at Doctors Without Borders recently began distributing a 500-calorie "Plumpy'nut" peanut-paste bar developed by French scientist André Briand that can be packaged in foil, is resistant to spoilage, and can be injected with a slurry of vitamins and minerals that saves lives. A couple of foil packets a day is a miracle cure for the starving

(proximate normalcy can be attained within a week or two), and an inexpensive foundation for long-term child (and adult) nutrition.³⁵ Here is a consumer product designed to rescue children from death.

Simpler yet is the mosquito net, an old remedy newly advocated by Jeffrey Sachs, once an ardent partisan of privatization and market strategies, whose recent work has moved in a very different direction.³⁶ Sachs has focused attention on simple products as exemplars of the kinds of commodities capitalism can produce to meet genuine needs around the world. A favorite example is the mosquito net. Malaria and many other communicable diseases that continue to ravage Africa and other poor regions of the world are spread primarily by mosquitoes. Protecting exposed populations with bed mosquito nets is an efficient and inexpensive prophylactic against these diseases as well as against those even more dangerous infections (such as HIV/AIDS) that attack those whose immune systems are already weakened by mosquito-borne plagues like malaria. Yet even an item as cheap as a mosquito net is beyond the means of those who most need it. It could offer an adventurous company a potentially lucrative market niche, but the risks are considerable and the profits far down the time line in a marketplace that no longer accepts deferred gratification as a standard. Sachs thus must depend for his mosquito-net campaign on international aid organizations and philanthropy of the sort made available by the Gates and Clinton foundations, while capitalism's efficient market mechanisms are more or less shut out.

The crucial question for all such products, from vaccines to mosquito nets, is how to make them a source of profit so that the great engine of capitalism can be turned toward providing them for the markets where they are needed. Currently their claim to attention rests on the ethical entailments of what the psychologists T. Berry Brazelton and Stanley I. Greenspan call the "irreducible needs of children," which effectively create "core rights" demanding a response. But the reality is that moral claims are not sufficient to animate the private marketplace, which moves according to a potential client's capacity to pay rather than on the righteousness of her needs. Capitalism "needs" to be able to address the vast and untapped marketplace of the billions around the world who still have

real needs, and it "needs" to move away from having to manufacture faux needs for those whose wants have been largely satisfied. Moreover, this need of capitalism corresponds perfectly to the need of the world's poor to have their own real needs satisfied. Yet the market mechanism itself forbids that the two sets of needs intersect.

In discussing the donation of the greater part of his fortune to the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, billionaire Warren Buffett acknowledged that although he is "a big believer in the market system 95% of the time . . . it's done pretty well by me, and the world . . . there are things where the market system is not going to solve the problem."³⁷ So although only a few of the core or irreducible needs enumerated by Brazelton and Greenspan or fellow psychologist Abraham Maslow are material in character—aimed at nutrition, housing, health, and security³⁸—those crucial few remain mostly without impact on the market and on world trade, which continues to focus on the real if fragile market defined by the artificially induced faux needs of the prosperous. Brazelton and Greenspan are correct in arguing that "our society is failing many of its families and small children at present," but only if a way can be found for capitalism to target irreducible needs is this injustice likely to be redressed.³⁹

Is it possible for capitalism to revamp its mission within the limits of the modern consumer market? Those engaged in the experiment seem dubious. Jeffrey Sachs no longer seems to put much faith in the market efficiency he once championed, and looks more to significant governmental and NGO participation in prompting the market to make a contribution. He calls on private philanthropies but also on the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the World Health Organization, and other international institutions to become active in his campaign to address African disease, poverty, and malnutrition. He relies heavily on achieving compliance with the unmet United Nations Millennium Development Goals, which ask developed nations to raise their foreign aid contributions to 0.7 percent of their GNPs—a modest goal that would nonetheless require "generous" European nations to double their expenditures (from a current rate of about 0.4 percent), and require the United States to increase its aid nearly fourfold (from what is currently less than 0.2 percent).⁴⁰ In

the absence of such formidable increases in government aid, he worries that real change will not be possible.

Nevertheless, there are three experiments under way that depend on the market itself and that aim at redirecting capitalism by utilizing its flexible potential for change. These include the experiments proposed by three imaginative economic pioneers: C. K. Prahalad's strategy of mining "the fortune at the bottom of the [consumer] pyramid" by turning the world's poor into paying consumers; Muhammad Yunus's idea for lifting women and their families out of poverty through microcredit, a small loan program for the impoverished to jump-start market development in communities barred by poverty from market participation; and Hernando de Soto's inventive idea of addressing poverty by legalizing informal and black-market elements of the private economy that represent real but largely unrealized wealth among populations that are poor in name rather than substance—if their invisible wealth can be unlocked. Each of these proposals, which I will only touch on here, has the virtue of relying on the market itself to cure what seems to be the market's inability to address global inequalities and use its capitalist potential to treat world poverty and overcome global inequality. Although each, as I will show, finally depends, like almost every reform we have examined here, on some form of government intervention, they remind us of the dynamism of capitalism when it is liberated from a dominant cultural ethos to which it has become tethered, and allowed to serve a system that by addressing real need can accommodate justice as well as prosperity.

In his popular text with the self-explanatory title *The Fortune at the Bottom of the Pyramid*, C. K. Prahalad, an economist at the University of Michigan, seeks to reattach the heavy load of poverty reduction to the engine of what he calls an "inclusive capitalism" by treating the poor as a capitalist "growth opportunity" in which their own collaborative contribution is critical. Although he recognizes that to date "the large-scale private sector was only marginally involved in dealing with the problems of 80 percent of humanity," Prahalad rejects the paternalistic notion of the poor as "wards of the state." Rather, he asks how one might mobilize the "resources, scale, and scope of large firms to co-create solutions to the

problems at the bottom of the pyramid (BOP), those four billion people who live on less than \$2 a day?"⁴¹

The virtue of Prahalad's approach is that he begins not with a new but with the classical definition of capitalism—which approaches the eradication of poverty precisely as it approaches every market need: by figuring out how to respond effectively to need expressed as market demand in a manner that earns profits for investors and producers. He turns the challenge of making capitalism work in impoverished settings at the bottom of the pyramid—few are trying to meet the desperate needs to be found there—into a virtue. After all, is there not an inviting market opportunity to be found at the bottom of the pyramid where it is still possible to capture the largest number of unsatisfied consumers left on the planet today, over half the world's population? Although they are without the wherewithal to pay for what they need, Prahalad hopes to enlist the poor as participants in creating the new market that will address their needs. He understands that there is no existing market, and hence few companies willing to invest. The challenge is to create a new market through what is "essentially a developmental activity," converting the poor into potential consumers. This means converting "poverty into an opportunity for all concerned" and calls for a cooperative strategy in which governments, NGOs, corporations, and the poor themselves are engaged in collaborative activity. Prahalad focuses on how the poor see themselves, and believes changes in discourse and self-image can contribute to changes in behavior. A discourse centered on "the poor" and "alleviating poverty" cannot draw investors and producers into low-profit new markets. The "needy" draw pity, not investment; on the other hand, "collaborators" are potential customers.

Prahalad's strategy can be criticized for assuming up front the very changes it must produce in order for it to succeed: if the poor knew how to bootstrap themselves out of their victim status into entrepreneurship, they would not be poor. Yet it is also true that if cultural ethos is about how we see and identify ourselves, then encouraging a language of consumer demand as a substitute for the language of desperate neediness can make a difference. Prahalad has also been criticized for confining his

research largely to India and Latin America (Peru, Mexico, Brazil, and Nicaragua) where attitudes toward poverty are already changing and development is already well under way and thus, the challenges of poverty less formidable than in say Africa or the Middle East. Prahalad also cites the work of Unilever's Indian subsidiary Hindustan Lever Limited, but despite persistent inequality India is well along in the process of energizing its consumer sector and leapfrogging over rivals in the world trade market. Indeed, nowadays, India is often cited as an example of the new competition that lazy old industrial nations like the United States are going to have to contend with (this was a topic of President Bush's 2006 State of the Union speech and is a perennial theme of pundit Thomas Friedman), rather than as an exemplar of the kind of traditional poverty to which markets have not yet begun to respond. Africa is the real test for any theory of market revisionism.

Muhammad Yunus's Grameen Bank, begun in 1976 in Bangladesh (at the time a major site of extreme underdevelopment), is a second example of capitalism's capacity for self-revision.⁴² Yunus quickly grasped that to mine what Prahalad called the bottom of the pyramid meant jumpstarting the engagement of the poor in their own bootstrapping operation. Which was to say, doing what Prahalad failed to do, giving them the boots by which to bootstrap. Attitude change would not be enough. Very small loans, often \$50 or less, could give people with nothing just enough capital to do something. Such marginal changes could be critical. It was well known in the developed world that the difference between a working head of family and a homeless vagrant might be a month's shortfall on a rental payment. Yunus saw that in the developing world the difference between an impoverished mother unable to meet the needs of her own children and a village dynamo helping the whole community rise up out of poverty might be a microloan of a few dollars, enabling her to start up (for example) a modest cottage-industry basket business. Microcredit can turn the poor into self-employed producers, and transform the needy into viable consumers in the global marketplace.

Like Prahalad, Yunus also understood that discourse and ethos were at stake. His most radical innovation was thus to treat credit as a right, urg-

ing banks to rely on trust and the engagement of the bank itself in guiding the client's investment as collateral to secure the loan. Since the loans were labor intensive (the banks struck around to help make their investments productive), they carried high interest rates, often more than 50 or 60 percent of the original loan. But a \$50 loan repaid at \$80 after a year that established a real business which lifted a family out of poverty was a pretty good deal for lender and borrower alike.⁴³ And although Yunus insisted on credit as a right, he also understood that lender institutions had to be sustainable, which is to say at least marginally profitable.⁴⁴ This was not philanthropy, but prudent market investment that helped create the market in which it invested.

A decade after Yunus's pioneering work, microcredit has become an important tool of the international aid and development community and has made the Grameen Bank a model of how finance capitalism can contribute to development without altogether slighting profit. The year 2005 was the International Year of Microcredit, widely supported by the IMF, the World Bank, and the United Nations. The microcredit strategy has been used throughout the Third World, and been the subject of some experimental work in Third World enclaves inside the First World, in Los Angeles, for example. It depends on a market logic but conceives of the market as part of a larger world of values and norms for which the wealthy are no less responsible than the poor.

In a third example of what can be called self-reforming market capitalism, the Peruvian economist and head of the Institute for Liberty and Democracy Hernando de Soto has attracted wide attention for his proposal to confront apparent poverty by finding ways to capture hidden wealth in the world of the poor. Market zealots like Margaret Thatcher and Milton Friedman as well as justice-seeking egalitarians like former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and former United Nations Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar have alike welcomed de Soto's effort to bring "dead capital" into the real economy by titling untitled assets and thereby empowering the poor to whom the assets belong as players in that economy.

De Soto's insight was to recognize that if the extralegality of much of

the global property system could be overcome so that those who possessed it could use it, invest it, and borrow on it—"own" it in the legal sense—much of what passed as poverty would cease to exist in many places around the world. As a sympathetic critic put it, "the problem with poor countries is not that they lack savings, but that they lack the system of property that identifies legal ownership and therefore they cannot borrow."⁴⁵ What de Soto has managed to do is not just (in de Soto's title) to solve "the mystery of capital" but much more importantly, to help "solve the mystery of poverty." The potential energy and the economic value that is "locked up in a house" belonging to a family that lacks legal title to it, if unlocked, "can be revealed and transformed into active capital." For "capital is born by representing in writing—in a title, a security, a contract, and in other such records—the most economically and socially useful qualities about the asset."⁴⁶ Turning a house into capital means it can be used as collateral for a loan or the foundation for a business; it means that credit need not be furnished externally by a bank, but can be self-generated by converting the value of hidden capital already in the hands of a potential economic player.

Although de Soto suggests in his subtitle that capitalism has succeeded in the West and failed everywhere else, his analysis tends to prove the contrary thesis, a thesis that has been argued throughout this book: that capitalism is poised to fail in the West—where it produces goods for people with few real needs—but positioned at least potentially to succeed elsewhere and thereby help First World capitalism sustain itself. The challenge is whether it can title untitled Third World assets and give the poor the wherewithal to reward First World capitalism when it responds to their genuine needs.

Nonetheless, as with every other instance of responsible capitalism and civic consumerism described here, unlocking hidden capital is a political and legal rather than strictly an economic task. It is a function of politics and democratic legislation. In fact, in the absence of a political strategy that secures newly manifested capital against exploitation and abuse, the danger of de Soto's ingenious idea is that once the regular economy closes, legitimizes, and hence captures what de Soto estimates may be up

to \$8 trillion in formerly extralegal assets, these newly legalized assets are in danger of being taken from their new and rightful long-term owners—by use and effectively confiscated by dominant players already in the market—for example, monopoly corporations and corrupt governmental officials sitting astride the "legal" market economy and hence in a position to usurp claims to the newfound wealth.

Because he is a believer in markets, de Soto makes the mistake of assuming a "legal" economy that is neutral. Hence, he fails to notice that "legalization" also exposes newly recognized capital assets to the power arrangements that can define both the marketplace and the legal system. As tenant farmers discovered in the United States in the nineteenth century, formalizing their ownership over the land they worked certainly allowed them to collateralize their property, but it also allowed banks and big corporations to expropriate that same property when farmers failed to keep up with high interest payments or fell prey to a hard-luck growing season. What does not belong to you (even if you have used it extralegally for generations) cannot be taken from you (so you can continue to use it for generations to come). To take title to and own an asset is to become vulnerable to every claim on ownership that corrupt and power-deformed political and market players can render. Foreclosure, bankruptcy, repossession, and other strategies by which a system eats up the poor work more efficiently when hidden capital is revealed and given a legal title. This is probably one reason why the poor themselves sometimes prefer to hide assets behind extralegality, even if this means they cannot take advantage of legitimacy's benefits. Undocumented workers, for example, remain undocumented in part because they benefit from not having to acknowledge and pay tax on income or risk forced repatriation to their home countries if something goes amiss—as might happen if their status were disclosed.

This is not an argument for extralegality or for leaving assets untitled. It is an argument for insisting that legitimization of undeclared and untitled assets makes sense only when the legal system in question is not tilted to the rich, only when the political system is not dominated by the wealthy, only when the marketplace is defined by genuine equality and undomi-

nated power relations. The poor can afford to publicly own their hidden assets only when they publicly own their governments. De Soto's research suggests that in Haiti, the poorest nation in Latin America, the total hidden assets of the poor are worth more than 150 times the total foreign investment made in Haiti since 1804, when it won independence from France. Untitled assets in Egypt amount to more than 55 times the total of direct foreign investment there over its recorded history. Yet, in the absence of major political reforms and an end to corruption, it seems likely that a full accounting of such massive assets would benefit those who already control them extralegally less than it would benefit the exploiters-in-perpetuity who would seek to appropriate them. The people must trust—better yet, control—the legal system in order to benefit from the legalization of their potential assets in the invisible economy.

De Soto is a splendid and innovative economist, but in making capital visible he also has rendered power invisible. For his scheme to work, capital and power must be legitimated and captured at the same moment. Which will work only in a genuinely democratic, egalitarian society. As with almost every other experiment in market innovation scrutinized in the last two chapters, de Soto's depends on the quality of democracy, something the market can itself never guarantee and in its consumerist phase has consistently undermined.

Overcoming Civic Schizophrenia through Democratizing Globalization

Power is the missing constant in almost all of the proposals for capitalism's self-reform reviewed here. Once upon a time, democratization—which genuinely empowers a nation's citizens—rendered private power both public and accountable. Now, globalization often places both real power and its many abuses largely beyond the purview of national governments. The problems are global, democracy remains local. Voluntary codes need enforcement, and adding standards to which to attach such codes is a function of democratic deliberation, but there can be no effective solutions within the framework of national sovereignty alone because

interdependence—what Thomas Friedman calls a flat world—has fatally compromised sovereignty. Protecting children from commercial exploitation demands government regulation and oversight, but that cannot be achieved within solitary nations without encouraging a race to the bottom in which the market ruthlessly seeks out national markets willing to leave children unprotected. Consumer monopolies of the kind toward which Microsoft and Google naturally tend can be prevented only through vigorous antitrust legislation and government intervention in the name both of genuine private competition and the public trust, but there is no global public to entrust, no global legislature to enact regulations.

In other words, civic schizophrenia has to be treated globally as well as locally, but there are only local citizens bounded by their national loyalties, and they cannot rein in the rampant desires of unleashed global consumers. How can toxic substances and drugs, including tobacco and alcohol, be effectively regulated when they can so easily slip the bonds of national oversight? Critics of the American "addiction to oil," including President Bush himself, as well as critics of President Bush who protest his outsourcing of American port security to firms under the sway of "foreign" governments such as the United Arab Emirates, share a common illusion—that control over the production and distribution of oil or meaningful control over national port security anywhere can realistically be exercised by singular sovereign nations, even when they are hegemonic and democratic and even when they expressly choose to exercise it.

This lesson is perhaps most obvious when it comes to questions of global inequality, global rights, and global justice. Whether using the innovations of Yunus, Prahalad, and de Soto portrayed above, or trading pollution emissions on the global market, or forgiving Third World debt as envisioned by the Millennium Development Goals 2000, or rescuing people from genocide in places like Uganda, Sarajevo, or the Sudan, market reforms today demand transnational civic and political cooperation as well as international enforcement of a kind that violates the sovereignty both of the transgressing and the would-be enforcer nations.

In a world of interdependence, the sovereignty we seek to recapture is no longer an effective instrument of national democratic will. Citizens

remain creatures of nations, while consumers are planetary itinerants. Democracy is parochial, markets cosmopolitan. The remedy is no longer commensurate with the challenge. With markets globalized, consumers are the new branded cosmopolitans who respond neither to the siren call of nationality nor the therapeutic appeal of democracy. A capitalism dependent on shopping turns us not just into children but *global* children. For, in psychologist Allen D. Kanner's wise words, "with the rise of economic globalization, the commercialization of childhood has become a worldwide phenomenon," bringing "sophisticated marketing campaigns, including those aimed at children, to every corner of the earth."⁴⁷

We "kids" have lots of company around the world. China has almost 300 million children under fourteen, while India has nearly 350 million children—a subcontinent of potential "Zippies" waiting to be rushed into permanent consumerism. In many parts of the world, including much of the Middle East and Africa, more than half the population is under sixteen. These children face three possible destinies, only one of which can promise them liberty or happiness: a harsh life of exploitation as child soldiers, child sex-objects, and child victims where poverty enslaves, starves, or otherwise destroys them;⁴⁸ a far more welcome but ultimately one-dimensional, unfulfilling, and unfree life as consumers in the growing world of infantilized shoppers;⁴⁹ or a life of autonomy and dignity as empowered citizens of global civil society and democracy. Global victims, global shoppers, or global citizens—with the third option remote because democracy remains locked inside increasingly disempowered sovereign states.

The anarchy and illegitimate power of global markets can only be brought under control by the legitimacy and power of global democracy. In the age of nation-states, Thomas Jefferson (and John Dewey after him) once cried "the remedy for the ills of democracy is more democracy." Today the remedy for the ills of democracy *within* nations is more democracy *among* nations. The paradox is that democratic nations, intent on preserving the vestiges of a sovereignty that has already been taken from them by the brute facts of interdependence, have themselves become the most vociferous opponents of democracy *among* nations—just as once upon a time, supporters of the sovereignty of the states at the time of the

American founding were enemies of the Federalist quest to establish a more effective national union. This paradox leads democracies accustomed to exercising their will through sovereignty to stand squarely in the way of the transsovereign pooling of power that alone can offer their citizens a chance, working across borders, to control their common destiny. Only if they release their citizens, can the powers of citizenship be made to count across borders. As Trotsky once warned Social Democrats there could be no socialism in one country alone, today's realists must warn democracy's national partisans there can be no democracy in one country alone. Nor even—imagine the neoconservatives' utopian dream come true—in a world in which every nation miraculously becomes a working democracy, but relations among them remain unregulated.

In the absence of democracy among and between nations, sovereign democracies will feud and fight, and discover and rediscover in the global market only an arena for cultivating national advantages (as they do today). Neither port security nor energy policy nor hidden capital nor child pornography nor undocumented workers nor public health in any given nation can or will ever again be controlled and regulated at the sole discretion of that nation's sovereign citizenry. The world is interdependent not because sovereign nations have wished it so but because, in spite of their wishes, encroaching forces of ecology and technology, capital and labor mobility, crime and disease, and terrorism and war are quite simply beyond their control. Interdependence is not an aspiration: it is the reality.

Individual nations remain crucial players, however, as much in what they can obstruct as in what they can still accomplish. They can still frustrate internationalists and impede the development of transnational democratic institutions, as the United States government has done with its refusal to sign on to the Kyoto Protocol on global warming, a fact that has doomed the promising "carbon trade" market idea pioneered in the 1990s (allowing nations to buy and sell "pollution rights" within an internationally determined quota on the global marketplace), even though that trade has been partially realized on a regional basis in Europe today. Or as India had done in refusing to abide by the nuclear proliferation treaty, most recently with the active complicity of the United States. But even an envi-

rommental protocol signed by every nation cannot function effectively without teeth, since it remains susceptible to any nation's decision either to drop out or refuse enforcement on its territory (the dilemma not only of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty but also of the new International Criminal Tribunal and the Land-Mine Ban Treaty). As Thomas Hobbes wrote long ago, covenants without the sword are of no use at all to secure a people's safety. Noncompliers, free riders, and other outlaws will always be happy to sign agreements they wish others to obey as long as they themselves—in the absence of vigorous enforcement—can do as they please.

The market operates on interest alone and market contracts are obeyed only when they must be obeyed. Enforcement depends on making it in the interest of contractors to comply by raising the costs of noncompliance. This is viable only when there is effective enforcement. In a globally interdependent world where markets and the illegitimate power exercised by market monopolies are transnational, but where democracy remains national, there can be no remedy either for civic schizophrenia or social injustice. Poverty, for example, is ultimately political, and its alleviation cannot take place without the deploying of democratic power. Yet famines and health plagues today, like earthquakes and tsunamis, cross borders and to be efficacious democratic remedies must follow them across and beyond the boundaries of one or another individual nation's sovereignty.

There are, Amartya Sen proposes, "extensive interconnections between political freedoms and the understanding and fulfillment of economic needs."⁵⁰ The evidence shows not only that "poor people . . . care about civil and political rights," but that the achievement of such rights is a crucial factor in successful development.⁵¹ As proof, Sen reminds skeptics that "no substantial famine has ever occurred in any independent country with a democratic form of government and a relatively free press."⁵² But how to apply this formula to a global environment in the absence of global governance? Democracy must come first—justice and the realization of rights follow; but ultimately only global democracy will suffice. Likewise, infantilization will yield only to democracy, but can be overcome as a global cultural ethos only by a global democracy that can trump frontiers as well as consumers.

Long ago, Jean-Jacques Rousseau observed that "what makes us miserable as human beings is the contradiction between our situation and our desires, our duties and our inclinations, our nature and social institutions between man and the citizen; make man one, and you will render him as happy as he can be. Give him entirely to the state or leave him entirely to himself; but if you divide his heart, you tear him to pieces."⁵³ Today, however, people can belong exclusively neither to the parochial state nor to the local market because the arena that defines their activity is global. Happiness, like wholeness, looks to a more expansive identity than is afforded by either nations or brands. The infantlist ethos fragment us—consumers versus citizens, this nation against that nation—while the real context in which identity must be worked out is a global marketplace without guiding democratic or integrative norms.

With wealth and the commonwealth in planetary tension, economic prosperity and market entrepreneurship have been unable to serve social diversity or human ends. Culture jammers make fine rebels but cannot be citizens, so that the only semblance of power once associated with meaningful sovereignty goes not to the state but to whoever wins the struggle within the marketplace for dominion: not the Russian people but Gaspri; not the British people but Rupert Murdoch's News Corporation; not the Indian people but Infosys Technologies Ltd.; not the American people but Mobil, Microsoft, and ABC/Disney. Rousseau proposed that we see ourselves entirely as natural individuals or citizens, one or the other. But in truth, not even recluses like Robinson Crusoe or Rousseau himself could live alone in the already complex, interdependent social world that was eighteenth-century reality, let alone in our interdependent modern world today; citizenship can be no refuge for identity where a planetary civic community is required that does not yet exist.

To be sure, brand identities rooted in consumerism girdle the globe, making consumers—above all, kid consumers—the first and only global itinerants: solitary anarchists free to shop everywhere. Yet they are able to root themselves civically nowhere at all. Nikes walk the world and dominate the Olympics; Germans and Finns and Russians and Japanese "win" medals that prove only their atavistic insulation from the global realities that inhere in the Nike swoosh that nowadays adorns almost all athletes.⁵⁴

Religious identity also looms large, transgressing boundaries between nations even as it breaks up nations into warring theological tribes. Religion is too big and too small to hold together Iraq, trumping civil religion and civic identity at every turn.

Yet where market identity is cosmopolitan, and religious identities aspire to global expansiveness, civic identity remains small and parochial. There is a deep incommensurability between citizenship—even when it is allowed to resume its sovereign power over private markets—and these realities of globalization. So the challenge to democrats today is to find a way to globalize democracy not within but among nations: which means to democratize globalization—the ultimate challenge.

The prospects are less than promising. The institutions currently available, whether NGOs or international bodies such as the IMF, the WTO, and the United Nations system, while of potential use, are in the first instance creatures of the sovereign nation-state system rather than genuine transnational bodies, or of elites pursuing interests that are less than civic and democratic.⁵⁵ Global civil society is widely and enthusiastically discussed, but generally defined in terms of relatively weak “non-violent, legally sanctioned power-sharing arrangements among many different and interconnected forms of socio-economic life that are *distinct from governmental institutions*.”⁵⁶ But this separation from power guarantees that global civil society will be incapable either of employing legitimate violence to contain illegitimate violence (say in genocidal wars like the current one in the Sudan) or bring the weight of some form of pooled, global sovereignty to bear on anarchic markets. Global governance involving pooled sovereignty and genuine transnational legal and political power, on the other hand, continues to be seen as, at best, a romantic ideal of naïve, tree-hugging, one-worlders (as Rush Limbaugh might put it) and at worst as a radical conspiracy of treasonous cosmopolitans trying to subvert America’s (or Iran’s or China’s or France’s) proud national sovereignty.

The office of the Secretary-General at the United Nations may aspire to autonomous global influence, but the Secretary-General reports to a United Nations that was founded as and continues to be a body constituted by sovereign states. Its ruling body, the General Assembly, is a con-

gress of nations, not a world legislature, while its Security Council only reinforces and enhances the power of the extant superpowers. Likewise, institutions that are part of the international financial infrastructure such as the IMF and the WTO also represent nations rather than a global common good. Indeed, they disproportionately represent powerful nations with market economies, and thus sometimes seem to amplify rather than mute the influence of private market firms over governments. Corporations and banks effectively double dip: they use their influence *inside* states where privatization has secured their hold over politics, in order to defang democratic oversight; *and* they use their role *globally*, as the only international players on the world scene able to exploit global financial capital investment exclusively to their own interest. Globally, they can work through international financial institutions such as the IMF and the WTO (which they control through the G-8 governments they influence) to divert other poorer nations desperate for investment from focusing on their own welfare. Investment capital offered in the name of development is made “conditional” on recipient governments cutting back on spending and social investment. The market economy reinforces the governance of private capital geared toward endless consumerism at home and abroad.

What is missing is a transnational citizenry that might counteract the tendencies of the global market. What is missing are genuinely transnational civic entities on which to found such a citizenry. This deficiency is made more daunting by the paradox of solidarity that faces anyone wishing to construct democratic civic institutions. Religious and cultural identities are already “thicker” than local civic identity, providing more affect, kinship, and solidarity, even if sometimes at the expense of greater exclusiveness. When citizenship is made global, it is obviously thinned down, and its contribution to identity becomes still leaner. Compare a would-be “global citizen” with a zealous Wahabi Jihadic warrior: Whose attachments are likely to be more compelling? Can a Common Cause supporter match the ardor of a Northern Ireland Protestant? When civic identity is local, and embedded in a long civic tradition and the patriotic trappings of a civil religion (e.g., the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, the Gettysburg Address, the Emancipation Proclamation,

Martin Luther King's "I Have a Dream" speech), it can at least begin to provide an approximation of a kind of social glue that holds a citizenry together. Can it do the same in a watered-down global form? Some social philosophers and global civic practitioners try to promote the idea of a civic calling with global reach: a perspective that yields something more than mere enlightened interest, but what philosopher Virginia Held calls a global ethics of care.⁵⁷ Global media coverage opens us to global sympathy, and it is easier today than ever before to extend civic compassion across national frontiers to victims of genocide in Darfur or to abused child-soldiers in Liberia or casualties of a tsunami in Indonesia.

While the kind of social capital that arises out of cultural identity and traditional patriotism is usually (using Robert Putnam's distinction) *bonding* capital that holds people together by excluding others, the kind of social capital that is generated by common civic work and voluntary civic activity across national borders and that is associated with the civic calling is *bridging* capital—capital that links people together.⁵⁸ Bridging capital is easier to create with global telecommunications and an emerging global ethics of care. But to be effective, global citizenship needs to mimic what Anthony Appiah has appealingly called "partial cosmopolitanism," an attachment to the human community rooted in "the partialities of kinfolk and community."⁵⁹ In civic shorthand, many have used the neologism "global citizenship," an identity that begins in the neighborhood but spirals out to encompass ever expanding circles of civic diversity and cultural difference that eventually bridge nation-states as well. Global citizenship insists on the priority of civic over other identities precisely because civic identity encourages and safeguards other identities, while other thicker identities discourage diversity and repress competing identities.

As I have argued above, it turns out that democratic public authority—the public's right to a monopoly over coercion—is actually what permits a multivalent and pluralistic market order to be established and enforced. Public monopoly is thus the condition needed for private pluralism to flourish. Private authority of the kind supposedly found in free and competitive markets, though definitive of diversity in theory, tends to constitute actual diversity in practice. The American "civic religion" offers a singular

civic identity rooted in a singular civic calling and allows America to be home to many different peoples, cultures, nations, and religions. A monocultural (monoreligious or monoethnic) world on the other hand brooks no significant cultural, religious, or ethnic differences.

This is perhaps one reason why American multiculturalism, under the umbrella of an American civic religion, has been so successful, while French or Dutch or German forms of multiculturalism, despite good faith but in the absence of a compelling civil religion that draws immigrants and native born into a single civic calling, have been so problematic. The irony is that the "free market" (free from democratic control) strangles civic freedom and downplays citizenship and the civic calling in ways that undermine democracy and freedom overall, permitting natural monopolies—both business and ethnoreligious—as well as unregulated trusts to dominate; whereas the public monopoly of the sovereign democratic state over power is freedom's and diversity's real guarantor. This is why John Stuart Mill used as the frontispiece to his peerless essay "On Liberty" Wilhelm von Humboldt's impassioned declaration that "the grand, leading principle, towards which every argument unfolded in these pages directly converges, is the absolute and essential importance of human development in its richest diversity."⁶⁰ As Mill understood, liberalism concerns a kind of freedom that is not about endless trivial choices but about the pluralism of the human condition and the openness of human development. This is the freedom for which democracy is the condition—and the infantalist ethos the obstacle.

At this moment, however, when markets are global but democracy still national, democratic forces within national societies have a hard time cooperating across national frontiers. Liberal diversity remains invisible in the global setting because neither public liberty nor civic pluralism exist at all. Citizens may wish in theory to collaborate but find themselves constrained by the parochialism of their institutional constituencies. Global producers and global consumers are friends and allies, children of Davos deeply invested in free trade, unrestricted access, the free flow of capital, and the right to impose their standards on nations where they invest through so-called conditionality. Investors, producers, marketers, and

shoppers share a commitment to privatization and branding as well as to the ethos of infantilization that allow them to cooperate across national frontiers.

Citizens, on the other hand, face each other across those same frontiers as rivals and enemies, representing competing national economies that share neither a private marketplace nor a global commonweal. They still imagine walls might protect them from the malevolent forces of interdependence and the predatory effects of unregulated markets. Just fifteen years after the Berlin Wall came down, bringing the Iron Curtain down with it, many of the democratic peoples who celebrated its fall are busy constructing new barriers, bulwarks meant to impede the progress of global anarchy and market injustice and to protect sovereignty, but that will be equally futile in the long term. Not just actual walls to fence out illegal immigrants or insurgent terrorists, but government-subsidized trade barriers and media-driven walls of prejudice. Across these protectionist barriers, French farmer faces Nigerian farmer as an adversary, French agricultural subsidies undermining the capacity of Nigerian agriculture to compete, even inside its own borders, with foreign products. Across these walls, Americans seized by fear of terrorism stare down the immigrant labor to which American industry silently beckons. Across these hardened frontiers, German steelworkers face Indian steelworkers as enemies—any market victory for the one, a market defeat for the other—Turkish guest workers caught in the middle. Across these walls, fearful Israelis face desperate Palestinians in a standoff that can bring neither long-term security.

Yet the alternatives are uncertain in a world of persistent sovereignties. Peoples distrust one another's global instincts. Goods advanced as "common" by developed nations, such as global safety standards or child labor restrictions or environmental protection, turn out in application to favor the interests of the developed (where standards are already in place). They are defended in ways that prejudice the interests of the developing, who cannot "afford" new standards without losing their competitive edge over the developed countries. The West hypocritically demands that they forgo the self-indulgent, environment-bashing, children-negligent policies by

which the now developed once achieved their own rapid development. As if today's developing nations should pay the full price of the developed world's earlier bad habits. There can be no facile commonweal among these distrustful forces, no common ground for paradoxical democracies without common global interests who fear one another as much as they fear the free markets that make their workers and farmers so vulnerable.⁶¹

Democratizing globalization can make the circle whole. In overcoming civic schizophrenia, it revitalizes capitalism and restores the balance between citizens and consumers. It puts the trump card back into the hands of the public, now stretching across the world, and reempowers the voice of grown-ups in remonstrating with cultural infantilization's international influence. In John Updike's novel *The Coup* an African character named Ellillon observes, "I perceived that a man, in America, is a failed boy." Consumers are everywhere failed men, rendered juvenile and grasping by a culture of infantilism that refuses to let them grow up. The civic calling coaxes boys and girls into maturation and then into citizenship. It resonates with the culture of enlightenment which, in Immanuel Kant's conception, was defined by "man's emergence from his self-incurred immaturity." It points to collaborative norms and an "ethics of care" in which "relationships between persons, rather than either individual rights or individual preferences, are a primary focus," suggesting that such relationships can both extend and put a limit on markets and inform and strengthen global civil society.⁶² The idea of the civic calling relies on innovative forms of the traditional commons, including a new information commons rooted in new technologies. The new commons, mirroring some of the very technologies that contribute to infantilization, might include democratic versions of "*software commons, licensing commons, open access scholarly journals, digital repositories, institutional commons, and subject matter commons* in areas ranging from knitting to music, agriculture to Supreme Court arguments"—although building such a commons "is neither easy nor costless."⁶³

It has been my argument here that the cultivation of the commons is the work of adults. The immaturity about which Kant wrote two hundred years ago is today more than just self-incurred, however. It is abetted and

reinforced by external cultural forces that impede maturation and stand in the way of the commonweal. Resistance to these forces can arise out of a renewal of the civic calling. The civic calling invokes a society able to respond generously to children's "irreducible needs" around the world without turning adults into children or seducing children into consumerism in the name of a hollow empowerment. The civic calling takes Wendy's part in the age-old struggle that recurs in each generation between Wendy and Peter Pan. It acknowledges the true delights of childhood, and helps children be children again by preserving them from the burdens of an exploitative and violent adult world. It refuses to "empower them" by taking away their dollies and blocks and toy wagons in which to haul them and replacing them with cell-phones and video games and credit cards with which to pay for them. It refuses to "free" them from parents and other gatekeepers in order to turn them over to market-mad pried pipers who lead them over a commercial precipice down into the mall. Children should play not pay, act not watch, learn not shop. Where capitalism can, it should help protect the boundaries of childhood and preserve the guardianship of parents and citizens; otherwise it should get out of the way. Not everything needs to earn a profit, not everyone needs to be a shopper—not all the time.

WE UNDOUBTEDLY LIVE in an age of capitalism triumphant, but for democracy and variety to survive, capitalism will have to moderate its triumph and citizens renew their calling, globally as well as nationally. We need democratic sovereignty to moderate market anarchy and market monopoly. But sovereignty is no longer viable within nations alone. Paradoxically, as its most enthusiastic advocates acknowledge, capitalism itself requires such moderation for its own flourishing. Yet given the realities of the cultural ethos portrayed here, moderating capitalism and renewing the civic calling are formidable tasks, the more so because that will have to be achieved globally as well as domestically. Formidable but doable. Democracy is always aspirational rather than a done deal, more of a continuing journey than a found destination. Citizenship must have also seemed an improbable destiny for the subjects of monarchical rule in Eng-

land in 1650 or for the victims of totalitarian Europe in 1940. Yet by 1689, parliamentary rule was secured in England and by the 1950s rival European nations at war for three hundred years had learned to pool their sovereignty and create the beginnings of a European citizenship.

Today, under the hyperconsumerist conditions we have examined here, the civic calling will feel to many people like a vacant phrase, global citizenship like a utopian dream. I do not have a formula for their realization. Yet the brute realities of interdependence make them both necessary and in the long term (if we have a long term) inevitable. The only question is whether we discover or invent and then embrace new forms of global civic governance which the costs of the infantilest ethos cry out for, and which the crises of consumer capitalism mandate; or whether we first pay a terrible price in puerility, market chaos, and unrewarding private freedom. That price is already being paid, but paid by those who can least afford it, the very children we think to emulate and empower with our foolish addition to the culture of infantilism. This is the critical point to which the history of capitalism and of its ingenious and ever-changing justifying ethos has brought us. Yet as always, it is a history we have made for ourselves. So that as always, even under the harsh but seductive domination of capitalism triumphant, the fate of citizens remains in our own hands.

30. Lee Drutman and Charlie Cray, *The People's Business: Controlling Corporations and Restoring Democracy* (San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler, 2004).

31. Harold Bloom, *The American Religion: The Emergence of the Post-Christian Nation* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992), p. 22.

32. Robert N. Bellah, Richard Madsen, William M. Sullivan, Ann Swidler, and Steven M. Tipton, *Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American Life* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), p. 219.

33. See Jeff Faux, *The Global Class War: How America's Bipartisan Elite Lost Our Future—and What It Will Take to Win It Back* (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2006). Faux was the founding president of the left-leaning Economic Policy Institute. Harvard economist Jeffrey A. Frieden, a more centrist analyst, writes in his history of global capitalism that success is anything but inevitable, and depends in part on the leadership of powerful nations, like England in the nineteenth century and the United States in the twentieth. See Jeffrey A. Frieden, *Global Capitalism: Its Fall and Rise in the Twentieth Century* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2006).

34. Jeffrey Sachs, *The End of Poverty: Economic Possibilities for Our Time* (New York: Penguin Press, 2005).

35. Michael Wines, "Hope for Hungry Children, Arriving in a Foil Packet," *New York Times*, August 8, 2005.

36. See Sachs, *The End of Poverty*.

37. On PBS's *Charlie Rose* television show, June 26, 2006. Buffett, the second richest person on earth following Bill Gates, offered the greater part of his \$30 billion fortune to the Gates Foundation.

38. Abraham Maslow's hierarchy of needs include self-actualization, the aesthetic, the cognitive, esteem, love and belongingness, safety, and the physiological (material). Brazeleton's and Greenspan's include "ongoing Nurturing Relationships; Physical Protection, Safety and Regulation; Experiences Tailored to Individual Differences; Need for Developmentally Appropriate Experiences; Need for Limit Setting, Structure, and Expectation; Need for Stable, Supportive Communities and Cultural Continuity; protecting the Future" (*The Irreducible Needs of Children: What Every Child Must Have to Grow, Learn, and Flourish* [Cambridge, Mass.: Perseus, 2000]).

39. Brazeleton and Greenspan, *The Irreducible Needs of Children*, p. x.

40. According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, in 2004 the United States contribution to foreign aid was about 0.17 percent of GNP, second lowest after Italy which was 0.15 percent of GNP. Only a handful of countries met the 0.7 percent benchmark set by the Millennium Development Goals. From the OECD list of twenty-two countries, only Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden exceeded 0.7 percent, while fourteen of them fell below 0.4 percent. See the OECD website www.oecd.org/dataoecd/40/3/353879786.pdf. Complete data are available at the Sustainable Development website: www.globalissues.org/TradeRelated/Debt/UsAid.asp.

41. C. K. Prahalad, *The Fortune at the Bottom of the Pyramid: Eradicating Poverty Through Profits* (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Wharton School Publishing, 2004), pp. xi-xii. The publication of two articles, "The Fortune at the Bottom of the Pyramid" in *Strategy + Business* (January 2002), with Stuart L. Hart, and "Serve the World's Poor, Profitably" in the *Harvard Business Review* (September 2002) with Allen Hammond, signaled Prahalad's success in breaking through into the business community with his ideas.

42. For background, see David Bornstein, *The Price of a Dream: The Story of the Grameen Bank and the Idea That Is Helping the Poor to Change Their Lives* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997).

43. Indeed, one of the problems of microcredit has been that those institutions like the Grameen Bank that offer the first-round loans are edged out later on by big banks unwilling to take the initial risk, but who want to cash in later on second- and third-round loans where the lender has already proven her creditworthiness.

44. Hence, Yunus argued, "In fixing the interest rate, market interest rate is taken as the ref-

cence rate, rather than the moneylenders' rate. Reaching the poor is its non-negotiable mission. Reaching sustainability is a directional goal. It must reach sustainability as soon as possible, so that it can expand its outreach without fund constraints." Yunus also gives a high priority to building social capital, which helps sustain individuals in their new endeavors. Muhammad Yunus, "What Is Microcredit?" January 2003, available on-line at www.granaten-info.org/mcredit/.

45. Alan Budd, "A Mystery Solved," *Times Literary Supplement*, December 15, 2000.

46. Hernando de Soto, *The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere Else* (New York: Basic Books, 2000), p. 49.

47. Allen D. Kanner, "Globalization and the Commercialization of Childhood," *Yrkawa*, vol. 20, no. 5 (2005), p. 49.

48. See Peter W. Singer, *Children at War* (New York: Pantheon, 2005). Child soldiers used to be a rarity, but now, as Singer shows, they are commonplace in Africa and parts of Southeast Asia. Even the U.S. military campaigns to draw youngsters fresh out of high school into the military in effect promising them that if they do military service they will in time have careers and incomes that will allow them to be consumers.

49. At the beginning of the new millennium, India had only one kids' television channel, the Cartoon Network. Today it has nine or ten, with global corporations like Nickelodeon, Disney, Sony, and Turner pushing for larger market share. World brands such as McDonald's spread worldwide not only via their franchises but through links with bands such as Destiny's Child, whose 2005 world tour sponsored by McDonald's visited not just the U.K., France, Germany, and Spain but Japan, Australia, and Brazil.

50. Anantya Sen, *Development as Freedom* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1999), p. 147.

51. *Ibid.*, p. 151.

52. *Ibid.*, p. 152.

53. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Fragments politiques* (Paris: Gallimard, 1964), vol. 2, p. 510.

54. Nike is only one of many intrusive Olympic sponsors: "There were just 2,500 athletes here [in the 2006 Turin Winter Olympics]," writes Sally Jenkins, "compared to 10,000 guests of the 11 top Olympic sponsors—including Visa, Coca-Cola and McDonald's—which pay about \$50 million each for sponsorship rights" (Sally Jenkins, "A Hat Career: Don't Urbanize the Olympics," *Washington Post*, February 27, 2006).

55. David Chandler approaches what he calls the "imagined concept" of global civil society critically, arguing that it is more attuned to state power and elite economic interests than to the normative interests of international governance about which Mary Kaldor, David Held, and other ancient advocates of global civil society write. See David Chandler, *Constructing Global Civil Society: Morality and Power in International Relations* (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004). For those wishing to follow the academic debate on these matters, the new journal *Globalizations* headquartered at Newcastle upon Tyne in England is extremely useful.

56. Emphasis added. This is the definition of political scientist Anne-Marie Slaughter in her classic account of John Keane in his *Global Civil Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

57. "The ethics of care builds concern and mutual responsiveness to need on both the personal and the wider social level," and can be linked to feminist concerns that soften the patriarchal Hobbesian view of the social world that dominates thinking about the global marketplace (Virginia Held, *The Ethics of Care: Personal, Political, and Global* [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006], p. 28).

58. See Robert D. Putnam, *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000), chapter 20.

59. Kwame Anthony Appiah, *Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2006), p. xviii.

60. The frontispiece of Mill's "On Liberty" is taken from Karl Wilhelm von Humboldt's *The Sphere and Duties of Government*, translated into English in 1854.

61. For an elaboration of this argument in the context of the defeat of the European Constitution in 2005 and transatlantic relations among progressives, see Benjamin Barber, "Dreamers Without Borders," *The American Prospect*, August 2005, pp. 39-42. My new organization under construction, called The Paradigm Project, is designed to facilitate global thinking among internationalists looking for ways to encourage collaboration across borders. See www.civeworld.org.

62. Held, *The Ethics of Care*, p. 119.

63. Nancy Kranich, "The Information Commons: A Public Policy Report," Free Expression Policy Project, Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law, 2004, p. 1, available on-line at www.freeproject.org (italics as in original). Also see John Willinsky, *The Access Principle: The Case for Open Access to Research and Scholarship* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2006).